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

WHAT TITO HAS REVEALED

by Constantin Fotitch

The spectacular conflict between Tito and the "brotherly Communist Parties" of the Cominform took the Western world by complete surprise. The surprise was the greater because Tito has been considered the most influential Communist outside Soviet Russia. Also involved is the Yugoslav Communist Party, regarded by the Kremlin as its favorite offspring, somewhat as the medieval Popes considered France "the oldest daughter of the Church".

Yet the Cominform blasted Tito and the whole Yugoslav Communist Party, charging them with the vilest heresies to be found in the Communist decalogue.

As internal difficulties and divergencies among the Communists are always shrouded in mystery, it was and is still difficult correctly to appraise the origin and reasons of this sensational conflict. Seldom has an incident so excited public opinion. Endless comments have failed to give a satisfactory answer to two questions: Why did the Cominform -- undoubtedly with the support of the Soviet Government -- make public the scandal in its own household; and why did Tito choose to resist his hitherto undisputed masters in the Kremlin?

Tito had been assigned one of the most important roles in the Soviet policy of dominating Europe, and ultimately the world. During the war, Tito's mission was to prepare the ground for Communist seizure of power in Yugoslavia. Fighting the Germans was of secondary importance. His main and principal objective was to destroy the forces of General Mihailovich who, as he rightly judged, would have been the greatest obstacle to their plans in Yugoslavia.

In September, 1944, the Soviets sent their armies through Bulgaria into Yugoslavia, not for military but for purely political reasons. In spite of the unexpected and generous assistance which Tito received from the Western Allies, he could not destroy the forces of his rival, General Mihailovich; nor could he enter Serbia, the central and key state of Yugoslavia. Therefore the Soviets launched their offensive through Serbia, and the Red Army, under the command of Marshal Tolbukhin, brought Tito in triumph to Belgrade.

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The opposition of the Serbs to this unwanted tyrant continued unabated, but was choked by the deafening propaganda of glorification of the new despot.

II

The Stalin-Tito honeymoon seemed cloudless and nothing indicated a possible break between Tito and his masters. The Soviets flattered the boundless ambition of the local boss, and encouraged his well-known desire for luxury and ostentation. Tito, on his part, "played ball" with the Soviets.

He forced Communism on Yugoslavia -- a country basically composed of a peasant class attached to its soil and its freedom -- at an accelerated pace and with a ruthlessness unequalled in any other satellite country. All new methods used after the war in the communization of the satellite countries were first tried and applied in Yugoslavia. Suppression of political parties and freedom of the press; elections from one hand-picked list of candidates; merciless liquidation of the middle class and nationalization of all private enterprise and business, were all methods first practiced in Yugoslavia and then applied in other countries to bring them in line with the Soviet system.

Nevertheless, Tito was soon confronted with realities which were stronger than he had expected and could not be overcome even with the brutal methods of his secret police -- the Ozna. He tried to convince the Kremlin that the communization of Yugoslavia could be carried out only by taking local conditions into consideration. But the political high command in Moscow is absolutist, not only in doctrinal points but also in the methods by which Communism is to be enforced.

Until the end of the recent war the Kremlin had to deal only with difficulties arising in its own country. Solidarity with other Communist Parties was complete inasmuch as they had no responsibility for governing, but only for undermining existing governments. With the expansion into Central and Southeastern Europe, local Communists were faced with new problems which could not be solved by ukases from the Kremlin. The break of the Cominform and the Yugoslav Communist Party is the most spectacular evidence of these difficulties.

Tito and the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party who have sided with him have not in any manner relaxed their Communist ideology. They have merely tried to convince Moscow that a certain autonomy of action must be allowed in bringing Communism into practice in non-Russian countries.

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III

Here, in my opinion, is the basic reason for a rift which grew steadily deeper and provoked on both sides an accumulation of dissatisfaction until it finally became public. Communist doctrine demands merciless creation of a "classless society", and therefore requires liquidation of the peasant class in favor of collective ownership of the land. Tito tried to convince Moscow that he could not carry out such a policy without seriously endangering his own regime.

It was Tito and not Stalin who was confronted with Nationalist opposition, chiefly of the Serbian peasants, resulting from their inborn love for their soil and their freedom. He faced not only an open revolt (which he probably would have welcomed because he could have crushed it), but also a much more serious weapon: a passive peasant resistance which could easily starve the country and bring its rulership to a hopeless position.

But to the Soviet leaders Tito's attitude of temporization seemed "carelessness". He was accused of opportunism of the type of Bukharin, one of those executed in the famous Moscow purges of 1936-1938. Other accusations followed: Tito's regime is "nationalistic"; "hateful" to the Soviets; disposed to consider capitalist States "less of a danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union".

Tito, reminded of the fate of Bukharin, knew what could happen to him after falling into disgrace with his masters.

The Soviet suspicion of Tito produced the split in the Yugoslav Communist Party which developed two months ago with the purge of two powerful personalities (Sreten Zhuyovich and Andreya Hebrang). There was also the trial of ten high Party officials in Lyublyana, ending with death sentences for nine of them. When Zhuyovich and Hebrang were ousted from the government it seemed that this action did not go beyond the framework of the Yugoslav Communist Party itself. Today, after the Cominform has openly taken a stand in their defense, it is obvious that the Kremlin tried to undermine Tito by arousing against him the orthodox faction led by Zhuyovich and Hebrang.

IV

To the Soviet accusations Tito has not replied with accusations of his own, although it is well-known that he has many reasons for discontent. It is an open secret that Tito was profoundly dissatisfied by the lack of Soviet support in his demands for Trieste and for Carinthia, as well as for reparation payments from Austria. Serving as an instru-

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ment of Soviet foreign policy, Tito was used to determine how far Russia could press an aggressive policy before meeting with really determined resistance from the Western Allies.

Thus Tito retreated twice in his efforts to grasp Trieste, and the loss of face which resulted reflected only on him. Tito suffered another setback when he was reminded by the American and British Ambassadors in Belgrade that recognition of Markos Vafiades, the Greek guerrilla leader, which he was prepared to accord on instructions from Moscow, might bring very serious consequences. Tito also has reason to complain about the lack of Soviet economic support, the more so because Moscow ordered him not to participate in the Marshall Plan.

Failure to receive economic support from the Soviets has made impossible the execution of the Yugoslav ambitious Five-Year Plan, publicized and heralded by Tito's propaganda as the greatest achievement of his regime. Now Tito, through his trusted friend Kardelj, has been forced to admit that the Five-Year Plan is far behind schedule, and to alibi out by accusing Zhuyovich and Hebrang of sabotaging it.

Instead of answering the Cominform charges by counter-accusations, Tito has chosen to resist, while simultaneously professing his complete loyalty and fidelity to Stalin and the Soviet Government. To cover the split in his own Party he has arranged "spontaneous" manifestations of his followers who appeal directly to Stalin to help establish the whole truth about Yugoslavia and to annul the "unfounded accusations" of the Cominform. At the same time Tito has vainly attempted to gain support from Bulgaria and Albania, so as to present a united Balkan front. Both Georgi Dimitrov and Enver Hoxha, Soviet Gauleiters for Bulgaria and Albania, have quickly sided with the Cominform, leaving Tito isolated.

Having lost the confidence of Moscow, there is very little likelihood that Tito will indefinitely be left in control of a country which has such high strategic importance for the whole Soviet system and its policy of world expansion. Confronted with a serious and difficult situation with the Western Allies, and especially with the United States, the Soviets will spare no effort to eliminate every possible danger from within their monolithic system. But, regardless of the outcome for Tito, his resistance to the Kremlin shows that the monolithic bloc of the Soviets is far less solid than the Communists claim it to be.

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Not Merely Gossip

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July 14, 1948

By Frank C. Hanighen

Well-informed observers in Washington sound a note of warning to those who have been overly exhilarated by the admirable efforts to supply Berlin by air. It is true that there are substantial hopes of keeping the city supplied with adequate food rations, although present deliveries fall considerably short of the minimum tonnage required. But, it is emphasized, these food deliveries will inevitably be curtailed once the summer is over and bad winter weather starts. Also, despite heroic exertions, there is little chance of bringing in enough fuel supplies to keep a sizable proportion of Berlin industry going.

The main difficulty is technical -- as those who know air operations have surmised. A certain proportion of the craft is necessarily grounded because of ordinary wear and tear. There had been no preparations to handle the present emergency, and so there exists a shortage of parts and mechanics. Engine replacements and parts are being hastily flown to Germany, but all this takes precious time. Also, the bushes are being beaten in England and the United States to obtain mechanics, but that is not an easy task. In this connection, the political inhibitions of General Clay have raised a handicap to "Operation Vittles". It would probably be simple to recruit many former Luftwaffe mechanics right on the ground. But to employ Germans in such an operation seems too drastic a step to the timid American Occupation command. Technically, therefore, air ferry progress faces many difficulties which are not stressed by the exuberant correspondents in Berlin.

The over-all strategy of taking this stand at Berlin seems likely to continue, although there are many high figures who are pessimistic and less steadfast than is popularly realized. One consideration (among others) bolsters the determination to go on. It is the phenomenon of Marshal Tito. The crack in the Iron Curtain caused by the Yugoslav heresy makes many strategists think that the Berlin Operation should proceed. Something may develop, it is felt, from this new factor which might prompt the Kremlin to agree to compromise on the Berlin conflict. That expectation may prove illusory, but for the moment it is one argument that carries weight.

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From a student of Comintern affairs, we have received the following prognosis of the course of the Tito epidemic:

(1) Watch for Maurice Thorez, head of the French Communist Party, to show signs of champing at the Moscow bit. Thorez has not enjoyed the favor of the Kremlin in recent months. He might indulge in "deviationism" or other dread sins, or he might even lead a "Gallican" revolt against Moscow domination.

(2) Watch also for indications that Dimitrov of Bulgaria feels a bit restive under the Moscow yoke. If this particular puppet manifests some independence, then it may be assumed that the sickness in the Comintern is well advanced; it would appear critical indeed if Dimitrov should join Tito.

(3) Little but conformity can be expected at present from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Governments like those in Warsaw and Bucharest live in fear of the ever-present MVD and the proximity of the Red Army. Moreover, Gottwald in Prague sits too insecurely in power; he must bow to whatever clique rules in the Kremlin. However, some smothered explosions might be expected in Hungary.

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(4) Watch, also, for some sympathy for Tito on the periphery of Russia's far-flung Red line, particularly if Thorez should rebel. There may well be some pro-Tito manifestations at whistle-stop Communist stations in Latin America and elsewhere. Note that a small Swiss Communist group has declared for Tito.

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On the whole, the commentators did a good job and preached many sound sermons on the subject of Democratic Party disintegration in Philadelphia. Among the many themes treated, it seems to us two are especially worth emphasizing. In 1940, when we returned from Europe and went to work in Washington, we were impressed by a certain similarity between the atmosphere in the Capital, and that of totalitarian countries abroad. The mood, the attitudes, the policies of New Dealers seemed keyed to what one might call the "Fuehrer prinzip". Whenever a new and independent figure arose in his Party, Mr. Roosevelt took pains to remove him as soon as possible from the scene -- and the New Dealers nodded obeisance to this as to other White House policies. It was clear that one day, when the "leader" died, no Democratic figures of any mature stature would survive this process, to continue the Party in victory or defeat. The pay-off came last week, with the fantastic spectacle of a party frantically seeking a leader who could save it, and pathetically pursuing the Eisenhower grin which disappeared like the Cheshire Cat.

Practical politicians also observed that another Roosevelt error has come to full and bitter fruit. Mr. James Farley bustling into Philadelphia last week tactfully refrained from saying that the debacle really commenced when his opposition to the famous purge of 1938 was overruled by Roosevelt. In 1938, he wanted the Party to win, but above all he wanted it to survive, even if defeated. The purge violated every political concept in the Farley mind. He opposed it, as he opposed the third term, as a danger to the Party. Farley is, of course, not the most attractive figure on the political stage. But he did believe firmly in that pillar of our Republic, the two-party system.

The New Dealers, on the other hand, quite evidently wanted a monolithic party (as some doubtless wanted a monolithic State). They would tolerate no opposition within Party ranks, no variance of opinion. Also, there seemed to be a sort of fatalistic desperation in their mood, not unlike that of the Nazis, Fascists and Communists -- it was a case of "now or never", for, "after us the deluge". Anyway, Roosevelt tried to purge as many independent Democrats as possible. Farley reacted instinctively, as if sensing a move essentially alien to the party system which he respected. Many political observers believe that the unsuccessful purge of 1938 started the popular feeling on its course Republican-wards, with the Democratic defeats of that year. The centrifugal process set going a decade ago this week attained a velocity dangerous to the health of the Democratic Party.

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The civil rights conflict in the Democratic Convention points up the impending struggle for the Negro vote. It is questionable whether GOP chieftains adequately realize how they will have to fight for this bloc of the electorate next November. Republican political managers have shown little awareness of census changes nor have they well scrutinized the election return statistics. For decades, the custom of Republican managers in campaigns was to distribute a fair-sized piece of money to Negro publishers who awarded the cash to themselves through bills rendered for political display advertising in their own newspapers. In addition, an old and reliable troupe of Negro spellbinders and stuffed shirts from the big Northern cities were brought out to harangue Negro voters and remind them not to desert the party of Lincoln and Emancipation. Then the National Committee called it a day.

WPA and relief did the trick for the Democrats in the New Deal era -- and the GOP continued to flounder. Urban unemployment was severe among the Negroes and

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doles fed them. Mrs. Roosevelt's talents weren't exactly thrown away by the Democrats. But the Republicans still did not seem to grasp the problem. When, in 1936, after a canvass of the Northern and border cities, the Negro political writer, Earl Brown, announced in the New York Herald Tribune that the Negroes would vote for Roosevelt, Republican managers were reluctant to believe his prophecy. Later, an investigation of 15 Negro wards in nine of those cities, showed that Roosevelt carried nine wards that fall. Of those same wards Roosevelt carried 14 in 1940.

The war curdled the era of New Deal good feeling. Negroes did not like the treatment they were getting in defense jobs and the threat of A. Philip Randolph, head of the sleeping car porters' union, to lead a colored march on Washington, threw Roosevelt into consternation. Randolph held the pistol in a firm grip and got the FEPC as his price. But the FEPC had small effect in the Armed Services and the letters of Negro soldiers home caused bitterness. The net result is that the Negro vote has been cut loose from both parties and now, more conscious than it has ever been, is looking for tangibles.

Which way it looks may prove a powerful factor in the elections next fall. The title -- Balance of Power -- of a new book on the Negro vote by H. L. Moon is suggestive. Mr. Moon shows how, in 75 Congressional districts in 18 Northern and border states the Negro vote can throw an election either way. In the race for the governorship, Harlem voted against Dewey in 1938 and for him in 1942. Dewey's stock with the Negroes is pretty good because he made possible the election of Francis E. Rivers to a $17,500 judgeship in New York and because he put through the State Commission against Discrimination. But the principal point is that in these Congressional districts the colored voters are not disposed to choose GOP contenders just because The Rail Splitter set them free. There are 191,000 Negroes of voting age in Chicago; 162,000 in Philadelphia; 55,000 in Cleveland; 99,000 in Detroit; and 75,000 in St. Louis. The Republicans will have to work for this vote. The practical utility of Mr. Moon's book is impaired by a strong New Deal bias, but his statistics on the behavior of the Negro vote are incontrovertible.

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If Messrs. Dewey and Truman should conduct an intelligent debate on fundamental economic issues, the materials are readily available on Capitol Hill. The Employment Act of 1946 set up a three-man Council of Economic Advisers to the Executive, to gather and appraise information, and to recommend policies to the President on the basis of which he is required to present an annual economic report to Congress with recommendations. There was also established a Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report, to study it and to report to Congress. Senator Taft is chairman of this committee and its first reports, recently released, have not received the attention they deserved.

There are majority and minority reports on party lines. The minority backs the well-known Truman policies on controls for inflation, taxes, etc. The majority report challenges these White House policies. It devotes no little stress to the broad tax problem and its relation to the national economy, pointing out that the combined Federal, state, and local "tax burden of $57 billion [represents] . . . approximately 28 per cent of the national income"; and that "most of this expenditure does not contribute to the production of goods so that the Government activity constitutes a heavy burden on the economic machine to which we look for our standard of living. This burden is expressed at the present time to a large extent in the high price of commodities. . . . This tremendous burden of taxation is also a deterrent to hard work and to increased investment in productive enterprise. It takes from individuals money which might be saved and provide for capital expansion. It decreases the incentive to the additional effort to increase production". Senator Taft's committee has indeed put into words one side of the debate. It remains to be seen whether Candidate Dewey will utilize this storehouse of arguments, if and when Candidate Truman raises the challenge.

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Book Events

The Pattern of Imperialism, by E. M. Winslow. New York: The Columbia University Press, $4.00. Reviewed by J. M. Lalley.

Dr. Winslow in this elaborate study strives to show that there is no necessary relationship between economics and war. He finds instead that imperial rivalries result from the subordination of economic interests to the exigencies of power and to the impulse toward national aggrandizement. Here of course he is at odds with the Marxists whose theory is that imperialism arises inevitably from the saturation of markets by over-production, thus leading to a struggle among rival groups of capitalists for control of new markets. Hence, say the Socialists, the hope of world peace is inseparably bound up with the elimination of the profit system. Dr. Winslow disposes of the argument by observing that imperialism is a far more ancient phenomenon than capitalism and that its recrudescence in our time must be viewed as an historical retrogression rather than as a painful but necessary stage to a better world. Imperialism and militarism are essentially the same thing; they mean the dedication of the energies of the State to the pursuit of power.

Capitalism, as conceived by the classical economists, and imperialism are actually antagonistic, since the spirit of confidence and co-operation is necessary to commerce and trade. Dr. Winslow does indeed concede to the Socialists that "finance capitalism", meaning the complex manipulations of credit whereby monopolies are created and consolidated, becomes an instrument highly useful to imperialists in the consolidation and extension of their power. He also admits that the principle of laissez faire, if accepted in an absolute sense, is in the long run self-destructive and that the future of free enterprise must depend upon some rigid control of monetary systems. But from all this he proceeds to argue that State monopolies and socialized production, which are the natural sequels of finance capitalism, are even more dangerous instruments of power, and it is Marx, he says, who has given the best reasons why Socialism should be repudiated.

The notion that the imperialist wars of our epoch are merely a predestined phase of capitalistic decadence, though fallacious in itself, has nevertheless been historically pernicious. It has helped to encourage the belief that nations and even regions must strive to protect themselves against economic aggression by arbitrary and artificial devices; such as tariffs, curtailments of imports, subsidized production and so on, leading by stages to autarky, or the closed economy. But in any planned economy which stops short of totalitarianism, those to whose economic interest it is to frustrate the purposes of the planners can uusally find the means to do so, as witness, for example, the black markets. Thus wherever economic aims are subordinated to political aims, the police State and the reduction of economic life to its crudest terms become the logical corollaries.

To insist, then, as many still do, that economics and politics, are merely different aspects of the same impulse to power is to ignore the difference of ends. The end of economic activity is the creation and consumption of material wealth; the end of political activity, the acquisition and use of instruments of power. A free economy which must presuppose the mutual interest of producer and consumer and an imperialism which must depend on armaments are ultimately incompatible; and mankind is now at the point where it must choose between them. Thus the problem of war and peace is transferred to the field of ethics. Peace will come only if the idea of violence as the ultimate determinant in human affairs is rejected by the imaginations of men. To speak of "enforcing peace" is to employ a contradiction in terms. Here, says Dr. Winslow, lies the fallacy of those who are seeking peace through schemes of world government; in other words, through a superimperialism which can only compound all the political evils to which humanity is already prey.

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